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Abstract
Neural Networks (NNs) have increasingly apparent safety implications commensu-
rate with their proliferation in real-world applications: both unanticipated as well
as adversarial misclassifications can result in fatal outcomes. As a consequence,
techniques of formal verification have been recognized as crucial to the design and
deployment of safe NNs. In this paper, we introduce a new approach to formally
verify the most commonly considered safety specifications for ReLU NNs – i.e.
polytopic specifications on the input and output of the network. Like some other
approaches, ours uses a relaxed convex program to mitigate the combinatorial
complexity of the problem. However, unique in our approach is the way we exploit
the geometry of neuronal activation regions to further prune the search space of
relaxed neuron activations. In particular, conditioning on neurons from input layer
to output layer, we can regard each relaxed neuron as having the simplest possible
geometry for its activation region: a half-space. This paradigm can be leveraged
to create a verification algorithm that is not only faster in general than competing
approaches, but is also able to verify considerably more safety properties. For ex-
ample, our approach completes the standard MNIST verification test bench 2.7-50
times faster than competing algorithms while still proving 14-30% more properties.
We also used our framework to verify the safety of a neural network controlled
autonomous robot in a structured environment, and observed a 1900 times speed
up compared to existing methods.
1 Introduction
Neural Networks have become an increasingly central component of modern machine learning
systems, including those that are used in safety-critical cyber-physical systems such as autonomous
vehicles. The rate of this adoption has exceed the ability to reliably verify the safe and correct
functioning of these components, especially when they are integrated with other components such
as controllers. Thus, there is an increasing need to verify that NNs reliably produce safe outputs,
especially in the presence of malicious adversarial inputs [1, 2, 3, 4].
In this paper, we propose PeregriNN, an algorithm for efficiently and formally verifying ReLU
NNs. In particular, we consider the problem of whether a particular set of inputs always results in
NN outputs within some other (output) set. However, PeregriNN will also verify input and output
constraints that are interrelated by convex inequalities: this feature distinguishes PeregriNN from
other formal NN verifiers, which verify only static input/output constraints. And in particular, it
makes PeregriNN uniquely well suited to the verification of NNs when they are used as state-feedback
controllers for dynamical systems: in such cases, static input/output constraints are inadequate to
capture the most important safety properties.
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Broadly speaking, PeregriNN falls into the category of sound and complete search and optimization
NN verifiers [5]. Like other algorithms in this category, the optimization aspect of PeregriNN is
a relaxed convex program where the output of each individual neuron is assigned a slack variable
that is decoupled from the actual output of the neuron; the convex solver tries to minimize the
slacks in order to drive each slack to match the output of its associated neuron, thereby obtaining
an actual input/output response of the network (see also Fig. 1). The search aspect of PeregriNN
is a consequence of the fact that the convex solver often cannot drive all of these slacks to zero: in
such a case, the neurons with non-zero slacks can be regarded as indeterminate, and a search must
be conducted over all the possible combinations of activations (exponentially growing [6, 7]) for
these neurons. This is accomplished by means of conditioning on the neurons one at a time until all
possible activation combinations are exhausted, usually with the benefit of a methodology for ruling
out multiple combinations at once.
The main contribution of the PeregriNN algorithm is its search algorithm (and the modified convex
problem that makes it possible). Uniquely, the PeregriNN algorithm searches over indeterminate-
neuron activations in a way that emphasizes and exploits the geometry of their activation regions. In
particular, PeregriNN leverages the following geometric observation: from the input-feature space of
a network, the activation regions of neurons in the input layer1 are demarcated by hyperplanes, and
so have a much simpler geometry than activation regions from deeper in the network. To recreate and
exploit this advantage for arbitrary indeterminate neurons in the network, PeregriNN incorporates
two different levels of prioritization in its search.
1. Inter-layer prioritization. PeregriNN always prefers to search (i.e. condition on) neurons closest
to the input layer1, so that the next indeterminate neuron in the search necessarily receives its input
from a sub-network operating in a linear region; hence, the next search neuron may itself be regarded
as an input neuron of the complementary sub-network. This also depends on a novel convex program.
2. Intra-layer prioritization. PeregriNN furthers exploits this exposed hyperplane geometry via a
novel search priority within each layer. In particular, PeregriNN prioritizes the activation region with
the smallest volume: this is a heuristic that balances the accuracy of over-approximation methods
with the number of activation combinations they can prune from the search.
We used PeregriNN to verify the adversarial robustness of networks trained on MNIST [8] and
CIFAR-10 [9] datasets, as well as safety properties of a NN-controlled autonomous system. For
MNIST, our experiments show that PeregriNN is on average 2.7× faster than Neurify [10] and 50×
faster than Marabou [11] which are two state-of-the-art algorithms. It also proves 2 % and 80 % more
properties than Neurify and Marabou on CIFAR dataset respectively. PeregriNN is also 1900× faster
than SMC [12] for verifying the safety of NN controlled autonomous systems.
Related work. Since PeregriNN is a sound and complete verification algorithm, we restrict our
comparison to other sound and complete algorithms. NN verifiers can be grouped into roughly
three categories: (i) SMT-based methods, which encode the problem into a Satisfiability Modulo
Theory problem [11, 13, 14]; (ii) MILP-based solvers, which directly encode the verification problem
as a Mixed Integer Linear Program [15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21]; (iii) Reachability based methods,
which perform layer-by-layer reachability analysis to compute the reachable set [22, 23, 24, 25,
26, 27, 28]; and (iv) convex relaxations methods [10, 29, 30]. In general, (i), (ii) and (iii) suffer
from poor scalability. On the other hand, convex relaxation methods depend heavily on pruning the
search space of indeterminate neuron activations; thus, they generally depend on obtaining good
approximate bounds for each of the neurons in order to reduce the search space (the exact bounds
are computationally intensive to compute [31]). These methods are most similar to PeregriNN: for
example, [25, 18, 32] recursively refine the problem using input splitting, and [10] does so via neuron
splitting. Other search and optimization methods include: Planet [14], which combines a relaxed
convex optimization problem with a SAT solver to search over neurons’ phases; and Marabou [11],
which uses a modified simplex algorithm to handle non-convex ReLU activations.
2 Problem formulation
Neural Networks. In this paper, we will consider Rectified Linear Unit (ReLU) NNs. By a (n-
layer) ReLU network, we mean a composition of (n) ReLU layer functions (or just layers): i.e.
1We refer to the first hidden layer as the input layer.
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NN = fn ◦ fn−1 ◦ · · · ◦ f1 where the ith ReLU layer function is parameterized by weights, Wi, and
biases, bi, and is defined as fi : y ∈ Rki−1 7→ max{Wiy + bi, 0} ∈ Rki .
To simplify future notation, we define the output of each layer in the computation of NN (y0) as
yi = fi(yi−1) for i = 1, . . . , n. To refer to individual neurons, we use the notation (z)j to refer to
the jth element of the vector z. As a final notational convenience, we refer to f1 as the input layer.
Verification Problem. Let NN be an n-layer NN as defined above. Furthermore, let Py0 ⊂ Rk0
be a convex polytope in the input space of NN , and let Pyn ⊂ Rkn be a convex polytope in the
output space of NN . Finally, let h` : Rk0 × Rkn → R, ` = 1, . . . ,m be convex functions. Then the
verification problem is to decide whether{
x ∈ Rk0
∣∣∣ x ∈ Py0 ∧ NN (x) ∈ Pyn ∧ ( m∧
`=1
h`(x,NN (x)) ≤ 0
)}
= ∅. (1)
Note that the addition of the convex inequality constraints hj is a unique feature of our problem
formulation compared to other NN verifiers, and it significantly broadens the scope of the problem.
In particular, other solvers can only verify independent input and output constraints Py0 and Pyn .
3 Approach
Wiyi−1 + bi
0
max{0,Wiyi−1 + bi}
Actual neuron response:
yi
yi−1
Valid activation
Figure 1: Neuron activation by
minimizing a slack variable, yi.
As in some other algorithms, we convert the verification problem
(Section 2) into a relaxed convex program (e.g. [10, 25, 18]). Con-
vex programs of this type assign a slack variable to the output of
each neuron that is purposely allowed to differ from the actual
output of the neuron (as calculated from its inputs). Each slack
variable is then constrained to lie above the response of its asso-
ciated neuron, and the input and output sets from the verification
problem are incorporated as further constraints on the relevant slack
variables. The objective, then, is to minimize the sum of total slacks
in the hope that each slack variable will be driven to lie exactly on
the response of its respective neuron. In such a case, the solver will
have found a solution that corresponds to an actual input/output pair for the network, and thus decide
the verification problem. Mathematically, relaxed convex programs of this type can be written as:
min
y0,..,yn
n∑
i=0
ki∑
j=1
yij s.t.
{
yi ≥ 0, yi ≥Wiyi−1 + bi ∀i = 1, . . . , n
y0∈Py0 , yn∈Pyn ,
m∧
`=1
h`(y0, yn) ≤ 0 (2)
A valid input/output pair for the network is obtained when either yi = 0 or yi = Wiyi−1 + bi for
all i = 1, . . . , n. An example of this situation is depicted in Fig. 1, where the black dot illustrates a
choice of the slack variable yi that corresponds to a valid input/output pair for the illustrated neuron.
Given the efficiency of modern convex solvers, this is an extremely attractive approach when it is
successful. However, all formulations of this type suffer from the same drawback: the solver may
return a solution in which some of the slack variables are indeterminate – i.e. they do not lie on the
response of their respective neurons. In a case like this, the solution doesn’t correspond to an actual
evaluation of the network, and more work is needed to decide the verification problem. In particular,
the indeterminate neurons must be conditioned – i.e. constrained to be either active or inactive – and
then the convex program re-solved with these new constraints. This process is repeated as a search
over all combinations of different conditionings until either a valid solution is found or the problem is
shown to be infeasible.
The primary novelty in our approach is thus the way in which we search over the different possible
conditionings of indeterminate neurons. Most approaches treat all indeterminate neurons as roughly
equivalent for the purpose of search, and use ReLU over-approximation methods to guide which
neuron to consider next (and to exclude combinations when possible). Instead, we propose a new,
more efficient heuristic that prioritizes neurons in a way that emphasizes the geometry of their
activation regions: our approach uses this information to more effectively exclude combinations of
conditionings from the search space. Our approach has two specific levels of prioritization that we
described subsequently.
3
3.1 Inter-Layer Prioritization
-10 -5 5 10
-10
-5
5
10
. . .
Fixed-phase Un-conditioned
Sub-network Sub-network
Input Layer Output Layer
Layer-wise Prioritization
Figure 2: (Top) Activation regions
for a three-neuron NN with a 2-d
input-feature space. The NN has
two input neurons and one output
neuron: black and red lines show
activation boundaries for input neu-
rons; the blue line shows the acti-
vation region for the output neuron.
(Bottom) Illustration of the condi-
tioning order. Indeterminate neu-
rons are shown in blue, with those
already conditioned also filled-in;
all other neurons are active or in-
active as specified by the convex
solver. The next neuron is selected
from the red rectangle.
Consider neurons’ activation regions as expressed in the input-
feature space of a network: the activation regions of input-layer
neurons are always hyperplanes, whereas the activation regions
for deeper neurons are more complicated regions – see the top
pane of Fig. 2 for an example. Thus, input-neuron activation
regions are specifically subject to all of the geometric properties
of hyperplane arrangements [33]. In particular, the geometric
properties of hyperplane arrangements govern which input-
layer-neuron activation regions have non-empty intersections,
and hence which combinations of activations are simultaneously
possible. In the extreme case when there are more neurons in
an input layer than there are inputs, the reduction in possible
activation combinations can be considerable. It is known that
in such cases, the number of non-empty regions formed by
an arrangement of hyperplanes scales sub-exponentially in the
number of hyperplanes – i.e. the number of input-layer neu-
rons. In particular, the number of regions formed by N such
hyperplanes each of dimension n is at most
∑n
i=0
(
N
i
)
.
Thus, we propose to always condition on those indeterminate
neurons closest to the input layer, since this will recreate these
geometric properties for all indeterminate neurons within the
same layer – even if that layer is deeper in the network. Spu-
rious conditionings can thus be eliminated by evaluating the
compatibility of these indeterminate neurons according to their
activation-region hyperplanes before conditioning them. This
amounts to a direct pruning of conditionings from the search
space. Note that the sub-exponential savings is particularly
salient in shallow networks where the number of neurons typ-
ically exceeds the number of inputs by a significant factor.
This prioritization works because it effectively partitions the
network along a layer boundary into two sub-networks: see the
bottom pane of Fig. 2. The suggestively named fixed-phase
sub-network necessarily operates in a (known) linear region
because the phases of all of its neurons are fixed (either by the
convex solver or already taken conditioning decisions). Consequently, the relevant portion of the input
constraint set can be propagated through this fixed-phase sub-network to obtain an exact polytope
representation of its outputs. But the next indeterminate neuron to be conditioned can be regarded as
belonging to the input layer of the un-conditioned sub-network, whose input is of course supplied
by the output of the fixed-phase sub-network. Thus, we can effectively reconsider the original
verification problem in terms of a new verification problem on the un-conditioned sub-network, and
one where next indeterminate neuron to be conditioned is in the input layer.
There is one important implementation detail that is necessary to actually implement this layer-wise
prioritization, but which we have not yet mentioned. Notably, the search procedure involves re-solving
the convex program with neuron conditionings as we decide them, and in general, this may result in
new indeterminate neurons in layers closer to the input layer than the last neuron we conditioned. In
order to prevent this, and thus ensure that re-solving the convex program forces new indeterminate
neurons to appear deeper in the network, we modify the objective function in (2) with layer-wise
weights that strongly penalize slacks in earlier layers. That is we use an objective function like:
min
y0,..,yn
n∑
i=0
ki∑
j=1
qiyij s.t.
{
yi ≥ 0, yi ≥Wiyi−1 + bi ∀i = 1, . . . , n
y0 ∈ Py0 , yn ∈ P cyn ,
m∧
`=1
h`(y0, yn) ≤ 0 (3)
where the coefficients q1  q2  · · ·  qn are chosen so that non-zero slack variables are
guaranteed to be driven as close to the input layer as possible using the notion of prefix-ordered
monotone formulas shown in [12].
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3.2 Intra-Layer Prioritization
One important technique to improve the conditioning search is to use ReLU over-approximations
(e.g. symbolic interval analysis [34, 25]) to show that a particular conditioning cannot possibly
satisfy the constraints of the verification problem. That is if the over-approximation can’t satisfy the
output constraints, then the particular choice of conditioning can’t either. Over-approximations of
this type are best be employed when not all of the neurons have yet been conditioned: if a particular
neuron conditioning is impossible, then there is no need to check the activation combinations of
the remaining indeterminate neurons. The opposite conditioning can thus be incorporated into the
convex program as a constraint to aid the convex solver the next time it is run. In particular, when a
specific indeterminate neuron can be shown to necessarily be on or off, the inequality constraints for
that neuron in (2) can be replaced by the combined constraints (yi)j = (Wiyi−1 + bi)j ∧ (yi)j ≥ 0
or (yi)j = 0 ∧ (Wiyi−1 + bi)j ≤ 0, respectively.
However, over-approximations like this come with a drawback: the more neurons that can be both
active and inactive in a region, the worse the approximation error is – and hence the less likely that
that particular combination is invalidated by the over-approximation. On the other hand, the more
neurons that have both phases active in a region, the more possible combinations that are eliminated
if the activation region is infeasible. Thus, there would seem to be an intuitive trade-off between the
number of further conditionings that are possible within an activation region, and the likelihood that
those combinations can be excluded by over-approximating the network.
Given the need to use over-parameterized deep networks for effective training, it is plausible to
suppose that activation regions are roughly uniformly distributed within any un-conditioned network
(as defined in Fig. 2). According to this heuristic, then, the volume of an activation region is a useful
proxy for the number of indeterminate neurons that can be excluded by over-approximating the
network on that region. This volume heuristic is an especially convenient one given the discussion
above: after all, it is considerably easier to compute the volume of activation regions when those
activation regions are defined by hyperplanes, as they are for neurons in the input layer; again, refer
the top pane of Fig. 2.
Thus, we start from the observations in Section 3.1 to propose the following intra-layer conditioning
priority: we condition the next indeterminate neuron (within a layer) according to the (valid) activation
region that has the smallest volume. We reiterate that this heuristic is only reasonable to implement
because of the geometric basis we established above. Moreover, we have found that minimum-volume
priority is an effective heuristic across all of our experiments, which suggests that the aforementioned
trade-off skews heavily toward the accuracy of the over-approximation, not the number of neurons
that can be excluded. Nevertheless, this analysis suggests that there is a rich opportunity for future
work here. In particular, it is natural to consider the possibility of a volume-based prioritization that
is adaptive according to the properties of the individual neuron under consideration.
4 Algorithm
We now describe how our novel search procedure integrates with other techniques to form the full
PeregriNN algorithm. The state of our algorithm is captured by a list of conditioning choices already
made. The main loop of the algorithm updates this state once per iteration in two sequential stages: a
convex query stage and a state update stage. The convex query stage entails solving a single convex
problem derived from the current list of conditioning choices. Based on the result of the convex
query, the state update stage proceeds in one of two ways: it conditions if the convex solver returns
indeterminate neurons (i.e. descends deeper, adding conditionings to the state), or it backtracks
if the convex solver returns infeasible (i.e. ascends shallower, removing conditionings from the
state). Before executing the convex solver, we also include an inference step, which further improves
efficiency by providing the solver additional constraints that are inferred by symbolic interval analysis.
Convex Query. The convex query step takes the current list of conditioning choices, and translates
them into constraints on the slack variables as follows:
Neuron (yi)j ON: (yi)j = (Wiyi−1 + bi)j ∧ (yi)j ≥ 0 (4)
Neuron (yi)j OFF: (yi)j = 0 ∧ (Wiyi−1 + bi)j ≤ 0. (5)
These constraints are then added of the convex program (3), and the program is passed to the
convex solver to solve. The output of the convex solver (for our purposes) is a either a list of
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Algorithm 1 Verification of ReLU networks
1: procedure NN_VERIFY(nn, problem)
2: inferred = φ; decided = φ
3: while True do
4: inferred, undecided← SYMINTERVALANALYSIS(nn, problem.input_bounds)
5: sol, realxed_neurons←CHECKFEAS(nn, problem, undecided) . Inter layer prioritization
6: if sol.status == INFEASIBLE then
7: if decided == φ then return SAFE
8: else
9: decided← BACKTRACK(decided, problem)
10: else if |relaxed_neurons| == 0 then return UNSAFE, sol
11: else
12: neuron←PICK_ONE(relaxed_neurons) . Intra layer prioritization
13: decided← decided⋃ neuron
indeterminate neurons or the conclusion that the program was infeasible. Any list of indeterminate
neurons returned by the solver does not include any of the neurons we have conditioned on already
by definition. Moreover, any returned indeterminate neurons are at least as deep in the network as the
last conditioned neuron: this is because of the choice of the qi in (3) (see Section 3.2).
State Update. The state update stage proceeds to update the algorithm’s state by one of two
mechanisms, depending on the output of the convex solver.
Conditioning. If the convex solver returns a list of indeterminate neurons, then PeregriNN’s
unique prioritizations are used to update the state with a new conditioning choice (see Section 3).
First, the inter-layer prioritization is applied: the list of indeterminate neurons is sorted by depth,
and only those neurons in the layer closest to the input are eligible for conditioning. From these
neurons, the next conditioning choice is made using the intra-layer prioritization scheme: the
activation region with the smallest volume (that is also compatible with the other conditionings
in the layer) is selected, and added to the state. After the state update, a new iteration of the
main loop starts.
Backtracking. If the convex solver returns infeasible, then we have explored as far as possible
into the network given the current conditioning choices. Thus, the algorithm must backtrack,
and undo some of those choices to explore other possible activation combinations. Since each
conditioning choice is in direct correspondence with a pair of convex constraints – i.e. (4) and
(5) – and the convex solver returned infeasible, we know that these constraints are mutually
incompatible. Thus, we can use an Irreducible Inconsistent Subsystem (IIS) of these constraints
to find compatible constraints, and roll back some of the conditioning choices in the current
state. Moreover, since an IIS is irreducible, this method often rolls back a considerable number
of conditionings at once. After the state update, a new iteration of the main loop starts.
As an additional optimization, we perform an inference step right before executing the convex query.
Inference. Given a set of conditioning choices, it is often possible to rule out some other neuron
activations directly by over-approximation methods. Thus, we use Symbolic Interval Analysis[25] to
find other neuron activations that must follow from the current state of conditioning choices. These
inferred conditioning choices are converted to convex constraints as in (4) and (5), and added to the
convex program right before the convex query stage is executed.
5 Experiments
Implementation. We implemented PeregriNN in Python, but used off-the-shelf Gurobi [35] convex
optimizer. We ran our experiments on a 24-core machine with 256 GB of memory. For fairness
of comparison across implementations as well as single-threaded algorithms, we limited all algo-
rithms(including PeregriNN) to run on a single core.
In order to evaluate the performance and effectiveness of PeregriNN, we conducted two different
experiments, which can be summarized as follows.
1. We used PeregriNN to verify the adversarial robustness of NNs trained on standard datasets
(MNIST and CIFAR); this experiment allowed us to compare PeregriNN against state-of-the-art NN
verifiers both in terms of execution time and in terms of effectiveness at proving properties.
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2. We used PeregriNN to evaluate the safety of NN controllers for a LiDAR equipped quadrotor;
this experiment exercised PeregriNN’s unique ability to verify properties specified with interrelated
input/output constraints (see (1)) in a practical safety verification problem.
5.1 Adversarial robustness
In this experiment, our objective is to compare PeregriNN with other NN verifiers both in terms
of performance and in terms of effectiveness at proving properties. To this end, we evaluated
adversarial robustness of NN classifiers that we trained on the MNIST and CIFAR datasets. Each
property we considered characterized whether a max-norm perturbation of the input could lead to
a misclassification, and we parameterized these properties by the size of the input perturbation, .
Specifically, let zt be the classifier output indicating the belief that the input belongs to the tth category
out of M categories; then checking the robustness of the NN around x′ is equivalent to checking the
truth of:
∀x ∈ {x ∈ Rk0 | ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ } . NN (x) ∈ {z ∈ Rkn | max
i=1,...,n
(z)i = (z)t}. (6)
Problem (6) can proved by checking M − 1 instances of (1). Specifically, for each instance m ∈
{1, . . . ,M} \ {t} we check if:
{x | x ∈ Rk0 , ‖x− x′‖∞ ≤ , z ∈ Rkn , max
i=1,...,n
(z)i = (z)m} = φ, (7)
where z = NN (x). If any of those instances is unsatisfied (nonempty set), then the property is
violated. Otherwise, the property holds.
Table 1: Models used in the experiments
Models # ReLUs Architecture Accuracy
MNIST_FC1 48 <784,24,24,10> 96.5%
MNIST_FC2 100 <784,50,50,10> 97.5%
MNIST_FC3 1024 <784,512,512,10> 98.2%
CIFAR_FC1 2048 <3072,1024,512,512,10> 98%
MNIST Results. We evaluated the robustness
of three different classifiers for the MNIST
dataset using four different magnitudes of input
perturbation. The architectures of these classi-
fiers are shown in Table 1 together with the accuracy and the number of ReLUs for each of these
networks. We tested our framework with 100 randomly selected images and compared it with
Marabou and Neurify. We chose to compare with Neurify because to our knowledge, Neurify is
the best performing NN verifier on this dataset (and similar ones) [10]; we chose to compare with
Marabou, since it is one of the newest verifiers. Each query consists of an input image, and the
property to be checked is whether the network is robust against an  max-norm perturbation. The
timeout for checking each property is 20 minutes. Table 2 summarizes the performance of the
three solvers on the three networks. PregeriNN outperforms Marabou and Neurify by 50× and 2×
respectively on average execution time, and it proves 14-30% more properties than Marabou and
Neurify respectively. The results also show that for the cases that Neurify performs faster, PeregeriNN
can still prove more properties in almost the same amount of time. We note here that when running
Neurify on MNIST_FC3 with  = 15, it gave segmentation faults due to huge memory consumption,
and we counted these cases as timeouts. As shown in the table, the number of unproved cases
generally increases with  and with the size of the network; this is due to looser bounds estimates on
the neurons and larger search space induced by larger networks.
Table 2: Performance (execution time, number of proved cases) of the three solvers using three
different networks. For each cell, the total execution time for the 100 queries is reported together
with the number of successfully proved properties. The last column shows the number of properties
proved to be safe by PeregeriNN.
 Architecture MarabouTime(s) / proved cases
Neurify
Time(s) / proved cases
PeregeriNN
Time(s) / proved cases Safe
1
MNIST_FC1
MNIST_FC2
MNIST_FC3
308.8 / 100
682.2 / 100
38778.5 / 95
7.1 / 100
6.37 /100
384 / 100
10 / 100
7.806 / 100
91.6 / 100
97
99
100
5
MNIST_FC1
MNIST_FC2
MNIST_FC3
2198.6 / 100
41812.13 / 81
1200000 / 0
4058.6 / 99
45482.1 / 68
105088.2 / 13
595.726 / 100
5921 / 99
39477 / 71
77
86
69
10
MNIST_FC1
MNIST_FC2
MNIST_FC3
23329.0 / 94
107815.86 / 16
120000 / 0
24725.5 / 86
48650.74 / 61
100306.86 / 17
7580 / 99
80844 / 83
118478.55 / 4
29
26
1
15
MNIST_FC1
MNIST_FC2
MNIST_FC3
25039.82 / 89
84655.4 / 32
120000 / 0
8056.5 / 94
25211.23 / 79
120000 / 0
6330 / 98
31384.321 / 78
118356.89 / 3
3
2
0
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Table 3: Number of proved properties
out of 100 queries using CIFAR_FC1
 Marabou Neurify PeregeriNN
0.005 0 89 96
0.0075 0 88 92
0.01 0 76 78
0.02 0 57 57
0.05 0 75 74
CIFAR Results. We ran the same experiments on
different networks trained on CIFAR dataset. We chose
the CIFAR dataset to evaluate the performance of
PeregeriNN on networks with large input spaces (3072
features). Table 3 shows the number of proved properties
out of 100 random queries for each of the solvers. The
results shows that PeregeriNN can prove more properties
than the other solvers on networks with large input spaces
and ReLU counts.
5.2 Safety of Neural Network Controlled Physical systems
In this experiment, our objective is to study two properties: (i) safety verification of a NN-controlled
autonomous system and (ii) how our framework scales with the size of the trained NN to be verified.
To this end, we consider the problem of verifying the safety of an autonomous quadrotor equipped
with a LiDAR sensor and controlled by a NN that processes LiDAR measurements to produce control
actions [36]. One way to verify such systems is to discretize the workspace into discrete partitions
S1, . . . , Sw and check the feasibility of transition between these partitions to the unsafe set (obstacles)
O1, . . . , Oo. Let x ∈ R2 be the position of the quadrotor. As shown in [36], the next position of the
quadrotor is then given by Ax+B NN (Hx+ d) where the matrices A and B describes the physics
of the robot (e.g., mass, friction, .. etc) while the affine term Hx+ d captures the relation between
the quadrotor position and the LiDAR image. Therefore, checking the safety of the NN controller is
then written as: {
x
∣∣∣x ∈ w⋃
m=1
Sm, Ax+B NN (Hx+ d) ∈
o⋃
t=1
Ot
}
= ∅. (8)
Indeed, the system safety property (8) can be checked by solving w × o formulas of the form (1).
We use PeregriNN to verify (8) by varying the workspace discretization parameter  and recording
the execution time for 10 different NN that have the same exact architecture and are all trained
using imitation learning with 1143 episodes. Table 4 shows how the safe regions of the workspace
varies with the discretization parameter . PeregriNN is able to verify the safety properties for all the
networks and exactly identify the safe regions in the workspace. Next, we evaluate the scalability
of PeregriNN by verifying the property (8) for NNs with different architectures and recording the
verification time. Table 5 shows the scalability of our framework with different architectures of NNs.
PeregeriNN can verify networks with 100,000 ReLUs in just a few seconds. However, increasing the
depth of the network increases the difficulty of the verification problem. Note that the results reported
in [36], which uses SMC solvers [12], are capable of handling at most networks with 1000 ReLUs.
Comparing PeregeriNN to SMC solver in [36], we conclude that PeregeriNN can verify networks
that are 2 orders of magnitude larger than SMC with 1900 times less execution time.
Table 4: Shows the number of safe and unsafe regions for 10 different networks
Epsilon Number of safe/unsafe regions
1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
0.25 46/52 33/65 49/49 45/53 46/52 53/45 51/47 63/35 74/24 51/47
0.5 27/38 22/43 30/35 27/38 27/38 29/36 31/34 39/26 49/16 36/29
0.75 20/34 17/37 24/30 21/33 21/33 23/31 26/28 31/23 43/11 32/22
Table 5: (Left)Shows the execution time in seconds for checking the feasibility of transition between
a pair of regions in the workspace. We test the scalability of the solver by solving the verification
problem for different architectures by varying the number of neurons per layer and the depth of the
network. (Right) shows the verification time for single layer networks with different width.
# of neurons per layer # of layers
1 2 3 4 5 6
20 0.025 0.0479 0.1184 0.4767 26.76 0.257
128 0.267 1.57 243.8 3394.18 2740.341 1368.55
256 0.31 0.92 6956.69 136.44 4.4352 1471.29
512 0.679 19.83 5.43 10058.13 9649.55 35783.58
# of neurons time(s)
1024 3.374
4096 7.2517
20000 7.458
50000 30.189
100000 68.8614
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Broader Impact
New advances in AI systems have created an urgency to study safety, reliability, and potential
problems that can rise and impact the society by the deployment of AI-enabled systems in the real
world. Mathematically based techniques for the specification, development, and verification of
complex systems, also known as formal methods, hold the promise to provide appropriate rigorous
analysis of the reliability and safety of such AI-enabled systems.
This work provides a new solver to formally verify whether a NN satisfies specified formal properties
in a bounded model checking scheme. The basic idea of bounded model checking is to search for
a counterexample that violate the formal property. Such counterexamples can be then used by NN
developers to better understand the limitations of the trained NN in terms of safety, robustness, and
hopefully bias. This in turn can enable the use of AI in safety critical cyber-physical applications that
are generally regarded to have positive societal influences: autonomous cars and aircraft collision
avoidance systems, for example. This work can also be used to identify performance and robustness
problems in NNs that are used in non-cyber-physical applications: for example, NNs that are used
in criminal justice contexts or to decide creditworthiness. On the negative side, formally verified
AI systems may result into a false sense of safety since such technologies do not reason about
un-modeled behaviors and side-effects. Another negative effect stems from the proliferation of the
technologies that it enables: for example, increased deployment of autonomous vehicles has the
potential to cause job loss.
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